Post Office - Horizon scandal

[Hobbit]

I foolishly dipped into a bit of Jarnail Singh’s evidence today. He was the PO’s criminal lawyer for a number of years. That led to dipping in to some of Angela Van den Bogerd’s evidence, and then Hugh Flemington’s evidence. It’s good to join the dots and run several tabs on the iPad to corroborate some of the evidence. But it also boils the blood too.

Hugh Flemington reveals he’d read an email that had been sent out in an evidence bundle to another witness. Witnesses trying to align their stories??

Bogerd is asked if she was bonus’d on the number of branches she shut down. She waffles around it, and is pulled up for waffling. She’s then asked the question again but comes out with the same waffling but also reveals that she was. On other aspects she is called a liar. Brutal!

It was also revealed why Gareth Jenkins was dropped as the expert witness, and by default it also shows that the prosecutions were flawed. He was dropped because he’d revealed to Second Sight, the independent forensic accounts engaged to review the integrity of Horizon, that there are bugs in the Horizon. The issue was that he hadn’t revealed those bugs from the witness box, and if he was called as a witness in a future trial and it came out he’d withheld evidence in the previous cases the whole house of cards comes tumbling down.

 

[Hobbit]

As we’re in the silly season temperature wise I’m getting a few hours a day to look through the various sessions and trying to link them together with other sessions and witnesses. Just a quick acknowledgement and thanks to @SwingsitlikeHogan who has offered to help sourcing a decent format for a journal/Gantt chart that will make things easier to read chronologically.

This morning’s(6am) Quick Look was to review Ron Warmington’s evidence. Although credited with blowing the lid off the whole sorry affair, I think that credit should go to Computer Weekly, 3 years earlier, who were the catalyst for lifting the lid. And I’d add in Nick Wallis, a BBC southwest reporter, who jumped on board very quickly.

Ron Warmington, of Second Sight, has a fantastic CV for forensic accounting globally - it is seriously stellar. Although a bit of a waffler, his off the cuff sharp one liners about the PO are brutal. He totally shreds the PO on every level.

But I think his sharpest reply, which leaves the PO nowhere to go, is to a question from Fiona Paige, one of the Core Participants solicitors. She asked if Horizon employed double entry book keeping, and if it did why weren’t the financial errors spotted.

The core transactions in Horizon does use double entry but many of the bolt-on’s don’t. According to Warmington these errors should be almost instantly ‘Spottable.’ He quoted 2 examples, one which was spotted before it got anywhere near branch level. It was a £500,000,000 deposit/loan into the PO’s central account. As it transitioned through the system it automatically changed from £500m to £50m. The other was the SubPostmaster Jo Hamilton’s £2,000 balancing error that literally changed when she pressed the ‘enter’ key. Warmington said it’s such a simple double entry error it should have been spotted as soon as Jo Hamilton highlighted it.

He was then asked what the initial relationship between Second Sight & the PO was like and how/why did it change. Initially, the Post Office had an expectation that Second Sight would confirm the integrity of Horizon, and at this point the cooperation from the PO was first class. As Second Sight started to ask questions some senior managers were uncomfortable and cooperation fell off a cliff to the extent that the PO refused to supply data around specific issues. And 2 years into the relationship he said there was open warfare between Second Sight and the PO. The PO adopted a bunker mentality, and went after anyone who spoke out against them.

Although not mentioned by Warmington, maybe Ian Henderson(Second Sight) mentions it in his appearance, I do remember that Chris Aujard, PO General Consel, threatened to bankrupt Second Sight if they make public any of their findings.

 

[Hobbit]

I have just watched Ian Henderson’s, Second Sight, session before the Inquiry.

Brace yourself… Jo Hamilton’s prosecution was maliciously corrupt, a miscarriage of justice. A perversion!

Part of the remit given to Second Sight was that they review convictions in an effort to show that the PO processes around prosecutions were sound.

The PO investigator for Jo Hamilton’s case was a guy called Graham Brander. Brander’s investigation report had a very significant conclusion. No evidence was found of theft or false accounting. Graham Brander’s report pointed the finger at the Horizon system, and very much away from Jo Hamilton.

So why was Jo Hamilton prosecuted for theft & false accounting? A deal was struck. We’ll drop the theft charge if you’ll plead guilty to false accounting and sign an NDA to stop blaming Horizon. The PO needed to stop Jo Hamilton from blaming Horizon.

If the defence team had been given a copy of Graham Brander’s report they would have stuck with the not guilty plea. The report was listed in the index of the prosecution bundle, and was requested by the defence team. The defence team were told that the report contained legal advice to the PO, and thus was subject to legal privilege and would not be shared with the defence team. The report did not include any legal advice to the PO.

Second Sight highlighted to the PO of the misuse of legal privilege and that the prosecution was unsafe. This led to them receiving a very harsh letter from Rodric Williams, senior solicitor at the PO, advising them that they had no right to see legally privileged material and were not to include it in their report. Second Sight contested this, sharing the terms of reference given to them with Williams.

A new index for the prosecution bundle was then sent through to Second Sight. The new index did not include Graham Brander’s report. It was buried…

Why change the index? Why label the report legally privileged?

 

[Hobbit]

A 5 minute clip of Rodric Williams in which he’s called a liar. Very harsh words, and I note the chair, Sir Wyn, doesn’t step in.

Just to highlight one very crucial bit from it, the mention of the mismatch receipts & mismatch bug in conjunction with Seema Misra’s trial. Knowledge of that bug was known by Gareth Jenkins, who found it, who emailed the details of that bug to Jarnail Singh before the trial. And Williams obviously knew of it, as evidenced in the short video. That knowledge was not shared with the defence team.

Seema Misra was sent to jail…

 

[Voyager EMH]

What a squirming worm!

 

[Hobbit]

What a squirming worm!

I’ve just finished rewatching his final session of 3 at the Inquiry. Time and again he says I wasn’t involved in x, y, z till later, and time and again he’s taken to documents and emails from earlier dates that show he was central to many of the issues.

Perhaps the most damaging admission he made was when he was told the Seema Misra’s conviction was finally overturned in 2021. Ed Henry, one of the Core Participants solicitors, reminds Williams that he had the evidence that would have overturned that conviction in July 2013. Williams, almost without thinking, admits he had that evidence…

Ed Henry had started his questions by reminding Williams of the solicitor’s code of practice, and had he lived up to those responsibilities.

Sir Wyn finishes the session quite brutally, see the last 5 mins…

 

[Hobbit]

Below is a brief clip from Angela Van Den Bogerd’s evidence to the Inquiry. Shockingly, time and again she’s accused of lying, and often taken back to various emails, and also referred back to evidence she gave the previous day. And let’s not forget Justice Fraser’s summing up at the end of the Group Litigation trial, 2019, in which he said, “[she] did not give me frank evidence, and sought to obfuscate matters, and mislead me.”

For those who might watch the clip listen to how nuanced many of her answers are. Quite often she doesn’t quite give a straight answer. I expect the Inquiry report may well mirror some of Justice Fraser’s comments.

 

[Hobbit]

Auto-reversal transactions, a bug found by Second Sight as part of their case review of Lee Castleton’s conviction.

Before going into the detail on this, why were Second Sight finding this, post-conviction, and not the PO pre-conviction?

If a SubPostmaster wrongly configured a transaction, maybe missing entering something in a data field, the system would create a reversal instantly and notify the SubPostmaster. However, whilst reviewing the transactions on Lee Castleton’s Horizon terminal a number of auto-reversal transactions were identified.

These are extremely difficult to spot as the system doesn’t generate a system ID for the transaction, it uses a user ID. How were they spotted? A number of transactions were generated out of hours, inc. Sundays. Further investigation of these transactions also saw a number of transactions using a user ID belonging to a member of staff.

But was Lee Castleton using a member of staff’s user ID when the branch was closed? A number of transactions were dated when Lee Castleton was on holiday.

And who was made aware of the auto-reversal transactions but consciously chose not pass those details on to Lee Castleton? Van Den Bogerd…

Lee Castleton paid £321,000, inc. costs to the PO, for a shortfall of £27,000.

 

[Hobbit]

Fujitsu’s actions, or inactions, with one of the bugs led to a number of prosecutions.

In Dec ‘07 Fujitsu found a bug in the system. The bug manifested itself at the end of a day’s trading when the balance was being calculated. If a stock roll-over/change was taking place at the same time, the new value for the stock wouldn’t be included in the account balance. Further investigation found that this bug had first impacted a branch in May ‘07, and could occur in any branch that had a new stock value to be rolled over when the system was running an account balance at the end of the day. Around 7 months of potential account mismatches across 11,500 branches.

Note; the balance mismatch did not generate an error code.

Fujitsu did not tell the PO for a further 2 years!

PO decided not to tell the defence teams in any for the prosecutions going back 2.5 years!

 

[Voyager EMH]

To me, that gives good cause for Fujitsu to be ordered to pay several £million into the compensation schemes.

They are liable in the perversion of justice case that needs to be brought against them (Fujitsu) and PO execs, investigators and prosecutors.

 

[Hobbit]

To me, that gives good cause for Fujitsu to be ordered to pay several £million into the compensation schemes.

They are liable in the perversion of justice case that needs to be brought against them (Fujitsu) and PO execs, investigators and prosecutors.

I’m playing catch up with a number of vids I haven’t seen as they were from before the docu-drama when I started following it. I’m able to link at lot of the evidence to evidence given by other, later, more high ranking PO employees. The picture I’ve been able to piece together in the last 18 months gets darker and darker at every turn.

The collusion between the two organisations is very, very extensive. The use of Gareth Jenkins as an expert witness, and his continued use behind the scenes after he had been discredited is disgusting. The hiding of the info surrounding Michael Rudkins visit to the help desk at Fujitsu, inc. sending ‘heavies’ to Rudkins’ house after the visit - that’s serious mafia stuff.

As Rob Wilson, solicitor at the PO, said, if we’d revealed that backdoor access and the ability to change account data all the prosecutions would have been stopped and previous convictions overturned. “But we decided not to disclose that to the defence teams.”

Jenkins could have stopped Seema Misra’s conviction and imprisonment by revealing, from the witness box, the receipts and mismatch bug was evident in her terminal.

Fujitsu are equally culpable, and they are still winning govt contracts. £650m from the govt last year…

 

[Hobbit]

I watched Brian Altman KC’s evidence to the Inquiry way back in May ‘04, and found it a little questionable at that time. Typically, other independent KC’s engaged by the PO for advice and reviews have been quite scathing in their criticisms of the PO, but Altman KC seemed to fall halfway between criticising and supporting the PO’s stance.

I had missed two critical points when watching the first viewing of that appearance. Update/correction below…

1. Jason Beer KC had been jumping between an earlier witness statement from Altman KC and a subsequent witness statement given with Altman having had sight of other evidence. Altman’s view/evidence is more in line with that given by other independent counsels.
2. (This one is horrendous)… Jason Beer KC took Altman through an email from Rodric Williams, General Counsel, to senior managers and directors in which Williams passes on legal advice given by Altman to the PO. Altman’s response is “I didn’t say that, that’s not even the language I would use.”

Subsequently, Altman responds to a number of questions from Beer KC about meeting minutes of Williams passing on Altman’s advice with but that wasn’t my advice.

As an aside, Rodric Williams, Jarnail Singh & a female solicitor, all employed or had been employed by the PO are being investigated by the Solicitor’s Regulatory Authority.

 

[Hobbit]

Two main points picked out from this (early) morning’s viewings.

First of all, Simon Clark KC was engaged by the PO to provide general legal advice surrounding prosecutions & PO’s legal processes. Subsequently, on reviewing Gareth Jenkins’ evidence in the Seema Misra trial, specifically the failure to Disclose evidence of two bugs on Misra’s Horizon terminal, he advised the PO, in Dec ‘13, that they should Disclose the evidence to Seema Misra’s defence team.

The PO engaged Brian Altman KC, probably the absolute top, top criminal barrister in the U.K. at that time. He met with Simon Clarke KC and the PO’s General Council in Jan ‘14. The topic of Disclosure was raised, namely the failure to Disclose “bugs, errors & defects” in the Horizon system to defence teams. Jenkins failure to Disclose from the witness box was highlighted as the worst example. Brian Altman KC’s written advice was that Disclosure must happen as a matter of urgency. Disclosure didn’t happen - Misra’s conviction was finally overturned in April ‘21.

Secondly, by early 2014 pressure was building against the Post Office. The Criminal Convictions Review Commission, CCRC, had sanctioned a number of appeals to go forward and there were also a number of civil claims against the PO. The CCRC wrote to the PO in June ‘14 requesting the evidence in a further number of cases that hadn’t even been requested by defence teams to go to appeal. The PO stonewalled, making the right noises and trying to build cosy relationships between the PO’s legal team & the CCRC. The PO tried to exert pressure on the CCRC to put an end to the appeals citing the Horizon had been shown to be robust on numerous occasions.

In Jan ‘15 the CCRC issued a section 17, statutory notice, to the PO that all Horizon related evidence must be forwarded to the CCRC. Jane MacLeod, the General Counsel who refused to attend the (current)Inquiry, wrote back to the CCRC saying that as no appellant had been named in the request the CCRC was operating outside of its terms of reference and that evidence would not be forwarded to the CCRC.

The Justice For SubPostmasters group, led by Alan Bates, were really getting organised by then and a number of civil claims, including the Group Litigation, were starting to take place. By late 2015 into 2016, the appellants defence teams knew exactly what evidence they needed to request… - and the rest is history. The PO took a serious battering. Justice Fraser’s summing up was brutal in the extreme. Following that judgement, and with the aid of political pressure, an Inquiry was ordered. And as more evidence came to light that Inquiry became a Statutory Inquiry, which gave the chair, Sir Wyn, the authority to issue subpoenas.

 

[Hobbit]

Has Michael Rudkin appeared at this inquiry yet or will he eventually?

From May last year…

For background; Michael Rudkin was a SubPostmaster & Union rep who managed to wangle a visit to Fujitsu to see the Horizon helpdesk in operation. As you would expect when arranging a visit like this there were emails and a record of signing into the building.

During his visit one of the Helpdesk technicians showed Rudkin that he could remote access a live terminal in one of the branches, something the PO had always denied. The visit was very quickly curtailed and Rudkin was ushered out of the door. A few days later Rudkin woke up one morning to find a PO investigator in his bedroom.

Rudkin’s wife was charged with theft from the branch, and Rudkin was sacked.

The PO & Fujitsu denied that the visit had ever taken place, and that Rudkin had made up the story to deflect from the theft. No record could be found of emails at the PO nor Fujitsu, nor of the signing in book at Fujitsu. BUT Rudkin had archived all the emails he’d received. The evidence was there….!

James Arbuthnot MP, now Lord Arbuthnot, is quoted as saying the behaviour displayed by the PO smacked of Mafia-like behaviour.

As to has Rudkin appeared before the Inquiry? Short answer, no. I guess there was little point in bringing him up before the Inquiry for what might not have stretched beyond a 30 minute appearance at which he would have confirmed his visit. All the questions that could be asked of his visit were directed towards PO & Fujitsu staff. The visit being assumed to have happened, and the questions being centred around what happened to the emails & signing in book.

 

[Robster59]

From May last year…

For background; Michael Rudkin was a SubPostmaster & Union rep who managed to wangle a visit to Fujitsu to see the Horizon helpdesk in operation. As you would expect when arranging a visit like this there were emails and a record of signing into the building.

During his visit one of the Helpdesk technicians showed Rudkin that he could remote access a live terminal in one of the branches, something the PO had always denied. The visit was very quickly curtailed and Rudkin was ushered out of the door. A few days later Rudkin woke up one morning to find a PO investigator in his bedroom.

Rudkin’s wife was charged with theft from the branch, and Rudkin was sacked.

The PO & Fujitsu denied that the visit had ever taken place, and that Rudkin had made up the story to deflect from the theft. No record could be found of emails at the PO nor Fujitsu, nor of the signing in book at Fujitsu. BUT Rudkin had archived all the emails he’d received. The evidence was there….!

James Arbuthnot MP, now Lord Arbuthnot, is quoted as saying the behaviour displayed by the PO smacked of Mafia-like behaviour.

As to has Rudkin appeared before the Inquiry? Short answer, no. I guess there was little point in bringing him up before the Inquiry for what might not have stretched beyond a 30 minute appearance at which he would have confirmed his visit. All the questions that could be asked of his visit were directed towards PO & Fujitsu staff. The visit being assumed to have happened, and the questions being centred around what happened to the emails & signing in book.

I remember the dramatisation of this on the TV series.

 

[Hobbit]

Number of convictions in the ‘90’s;

118 convictions, including 51 in 1999, Horizon’s first year. Only 67 convictions ‘90 to ‘98.

Number of convictions between 2000 & 2009 inc.

524 convictions… there were a further 192 convictions between 2010 & 2013. No figures after 2013.

 

[Hobbit]

Did the PO steal customer’s money?

Something I’ve often pondered. If the system generated shortfalls where cash on hand was less than shown on the system, were there occasions when the cash on hand was greater than the figure in Horizon?

If, for example, a book of stamps was sold and the transaction wasn’t registered on the system. There’d be a stock error as the number of books of stamps would be down X value but the cash on hand would be up by that value. And the obvious ‘tell’ would be that a customer receipt wouldn’t be generated.

But… what if the transaction was a deposit into a customer’s bank account?

I’ve just watched John Scott, Head of Security at the PO, giving evidence. He’s asked about an email string from March 2010, coincidentally around the time of the Seema Misra’s trial. A customer had queried why their PO bank account was showing less than it should and that a deposit wasn’t showing on their statement.

The Horizon logs were checked, a failed deposit transaction for that customer was identified. The email conversation broadened out to the implications of leaving footprints all over the system, highlighting bugs, and if a defence solicitor asked for information on Horizon bugs at a particular branch it would have to be Disclosed. A decision was made not to look for deposit transaction errors in branch terminals that were under investigation, the reasoning being that if a bug wasn’t found Horizon integrity couldn’t be questioned.

In her latter years my mother-in-law hadn’t a clue what was going in and out of her PO account. Including savings accounts in various banks she had 11 bank accounts. She wouldn’t have had a clue if a deposit had gone missing.

 

[GreiginFife]

Lee Castleton brining a £4m+ suit against the Post Office and Fujitsu.

Could this be the first of many?

 

[Lord Tyrion]

Lee Castleton brining a £4m+ suit against the Post Office and Fujitsu.

Could this be the first of many?

Hopefully. Fujitsu seem to have escaped too easily so far. They need to start paying a price.

 

[Hobbit]

Number of convictions in the ‘90’s;

118 convictions, including 51 in 1999, Horizon’s first year. Only 67 convictions ‘90 to ‘98.

Number of convictions between 2000 & 2009 inc.

524 convictions… there were a further 192 convictions between 2010 & 2013. No figures after 2013.

From the post above it looks like there's around 700 convictions. But what is the true scale of those affected by Horizon?

Sir Wyn's report goes into great detail on the human impact, listing things from suicides, attempted suicides, alcoholism, bankruptcies etc.

But what is the scale? Just how bad was Horizon, and just how evil and ignorant were those managing the issue?

A couple of numbers to shock you... out of 11,500 branches the total number of claims is expected to reach over 10,000.

The 'cheapest' scheme in terms of payouts is offering a minimum of £75,000 per claim. The most 'expensive' in terms of payouts is offering a minimum of £600,000. If every claim was the cheapest the total paid out will exceed £750,000,000. And the legal costs are already in the hundreds of millions.

Just a reminder... a number of members of the board suggested in 2012 that prosecutions must stop. Paula Vennells said we must continue.